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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
When the U N General Assembly, on the occasion of its 40th anniversary, 
placed its main emphasis and that of its members on the "promotion and 
realization of the peace ideal" by proclaiming 1986 to be the "international 
year of peace" and calling upon all peoples "to work jointly with the United 
Nations in a determined effort to secure the peace and the future of mankind", 
the reaction was ambivalent. The pessimists saw it as the "symbolic action" of 
a "papermill". For the optimists, on the other hand, it was a sign that the U N , 
as the universal international Organization, was in the process of re-asserting 
its function of securing the peace and collective security which for a long time 
had taken a back seat to economic questions, particularly those of the Third 
World . 1 
Upon closer examination it appears that both reactions were somewhat 
justified. O n the one hand, the U N has thus far been unable to prevent the 160 
wars which have taken place since its inception, mainly in the Thirld W o r l d , 2 
despite the fact that the Preamble to its Charter expressed the organization's 
determination "to liberate future generations from the scourge of war" . 3 Even 
in the "year of peace" over five million soldiers from forty-one states were 
participating in wars or armed conflicts.4 O n the other hand, the U N can point 
to a series of successful attempts to limit the damage. It has also succeeded in 
containing some regional conflicts and preventing a confrontation between the 
superpowers. 
A u t h o r ' s a d d r e s s : Dr. M . A. Ferdowsi, Forschungsstelle Dritte Welt am Geschwister-Scholl-
Institut der Universität München, Ludwigstr. 10, D-8000 München 22. 
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It is impossible to teil at the present time what the positive effects of the 
proclamation of October 1985 w i l l have on the future work of the U N . 
Nevertheless the U N can make a contribution by directing attention to a 
phenomenon which has reached epidemic proportions but which for a long 
period of time has not received adequate attention; i.e., the growing number 
of wars which have taken place since the Second World War, particularly 
within or between states in the Third World . 
U p to now research on the economic and development problems of the 
Third World has produced such a wide ränge of materials and findings that it 
has become impossible for political scientists, economists, and sociologists to 
have complete knowledge of it. Information concerning the dimensions and 
causes of violent conflicts in the Third World since the Second World War, on 
the other hand, represents "a blank spot on the map of the research landscape 
of social science."5 Nowhere in the world, including the Federal Republic, are 
there approaches capable of describing, let alone explaining, the development 
of smaller or larger conflicts or violent confrontations. 
Discussions in the eighties regarding peace and security policy have also 
failed to produce new initiatives. This can be explained on the one hand by 
their Germano- or Euro-centric concentration on slogans such as "Fight 
Nuclear Death," "Fight the N A T O Rearming Efforts," and "Fight Star Wars 
(SDI)". O n the other hand, this has been the result of the fact that Europe, 
thanks to N A T O and its strategy of deterrence, is experiencing the longest 
period of peace in its history. Even in those cases in which attention has been 
turned to wars taking place in the Third Wor ld , this has occurred more out of 
concern that these conflicts could lead to a repeat of the crisis of July 1914 and 
a "Sarajevo effect".6 To sum up briefly: By emphasizing world peace the U N 
has once more made it a central issue that at the core of all politics must lie the 
prevention of all types of wars, not only those specifically taking place in 
Central Europe or involving nuclear weapons. 
The urgency of such a long overdue "new beginning" are revealed particu-
larly in attempts to compile an "accounting ledger" listing the dimensions of 
the wars that have taken place since 1945.7 The numerous causes and reasons 
for wars and conflicts also call for a "reorientation" in the search for patterns 
of conflict resolution. A l l past instruments of conflict resolution, especially 
those employed by the U N 8 - the application of mandatory measures, 
arbitration through offering good Services and mediation, and the dispatching 
of peace troops - have obviously become inadequate. This is particularly the 
case if the U N wants to live up to its main task as outlined in Article 1, Section 
1, of its Charter; i.e., to "eliminate and end, via peaceful means, situations 
which can lead to a break in peace."9 First some comments concerning the 
dimension of wars since World War II. 
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II. A r m e d C o n f l i c t s since 1 9 4 5 - E m p i r i c a l F i n d i n g s 
The greatest problem in seeking to come up with a resonably reliable picture 
concerning the number and types of violent conflicts since the Second World 
War undoubtedly rests on the fact that research conducted to date differs with 
regard to the periods studied. 1 0 
In addition, considerable differences exist with regard to both the quantita-
tive and qualitative characteristics of these wars (such as, for example, the 
number of victims, the type and nature of the groups, the intensity and length 
of the conflict, etc.) as well as in the definition of war itself. 
Our own thoughts are based on the list compiled by the Hungarian social 
scientist Istvan Kende 1 1 . It has proven to be relatively reliable and offers a solid 
foundation for further empirical work. Kende's compilation is based on the 
definition of war as an armed mass conflict which has the following charac-
teristics: 
a) two or more armed military forces are involved in the battles, of which at 
least one must be a regulär army or other government troops; 
b) the activities of both participants unfold in a centrally guided, organized 
fashion, even if this does not mean more than organized armed defence or 
strategically planned attacks (guerilla Operations, partisan wars); 
c) the armed conflict is not based on spontaneous, sporadic clashes. Both 
participants work according to a planned, systematic strategy independent 
of whether the war takes place inside the territory of one single country or 
in several countries, whether the war is short or longer. 1 2 
Table 1 - Frequency of Wars 
Author Period studied Number of wars 
1. Sorokin (1959) 1100 to 1925 862 
2. Wright (1965) 1480 to 1941 278 
3. Richardson (1960) 1820 to 1949 317 
4. Butterworth/Scranton (1976) 1945 to 1974 310 
5. Kende (1978) 1945 to 1976 120 
6. Kende/Gantzel/Fabig (1982) 1945 to 1982 148 
7. Small/Singer (1982) 1816 to 1980 224 
8. Gantzel/Meyer-Stamer (1986) 1945 to 1984 159 
Source: Compiled from: M . Mendler, et al , (Note 10), p. 13: R. L. Butterworth/M. E. Scranton, 
M a n a g i n g C o n f l i c t 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 7 4 , D a t e w i t h Synopses, Pittsburgh, 1976; K. J. Gantzel/ 
J. Meyer-Stamer, eds., (Note 7). 
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The rather narrow definition of war according to international law is " t h a t 
c o n d i t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between t w o states - or between groups of states or 
between a State and a group of states - u n d e r w h i c h t h e effectiveness o f n o r m a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w - the so-called general peace law - has been suspended 
between t h e m . n Kende's definition has the undoubted advantage that its 
openness permits the inclusion of such phenomena as wars within states or the 
efforts on the part of ethnic minorities to gain their autonomy. O n the other 
hand the limitation to organized armed conflicts does not allow for the 
inclusion of, for example, internal elite conflicts in the form of successful or 
attempted coups d'etat, of which there have been 350 to date - 159 of them 
successful.14 
Table 2 gives a survey of the 160 wars, broken down into four different 
types, which have been "registered" thus far on the basis of this definition. 1 5 
The table also offers a regional breakdown (Europe/Third World) as well as a 
differentiation as to whether the intervention took place with or without 
foreign participation. 
The list shows some of Symptoms of "teething troubles", however, both in 
terms of the creation of types and in the establishment of foreign interventions. 
Thus it is impossible, for example, to include terrorism - "the weapon of the 
weak" 1 6 - or the new phenomenon of "hostage taking" as a "continuation of 
politics by other means" or "the mixing in of other means" (Clausewitz). 
Even more problematic appears to be the inclusion of wars of secession in 
"internal wars", since ethnic conflicts, though viewed as internal conflicts by 
international law, are seen as external wars from the ethnic perspective. This 
can certainly be explained by the fact that the distinction between international 
and internal wars has fallen prey to a fixation on the State, as K . J . Gantzel has 
noted self-critically. 1 7 
The characteristic of "foreign intervention" also gives a distorted view of 
reality, however, since in this case only direct participation in the fighting is 
included but not weapons shipments, more subtle forms of intervention such 
as counterinsurgency or low-intensity warfare.1 8 Also not included are indirect 
forms of intervention such as the use of personnel 1 9 or telecommunication 
instruments such as radio transmitters, for example, about which Henry 
Kissinger once commented that they can represent "a more effective form of 
pressure in the relations with many internally not particularly stable countries 
than a fleet of Strategie B-52 bombers." 2 0 
It would exceed the scope of this article to go beyond the data provided in 
Table 2 and carry out Statistical evaluations regarding the characteristics of 
wars. 2 1 Instead we wi l l here simply point to the most important aspects of 
wars. The "war ledger" to date shows that: 
Table 2 - A r m e d Conflicts since 1945 
Decade State Wars Anti- Wars within countries Interstate wars, Wars of Total 
total Regime based on religion, border wars decolonization (+) = multiple 
wars secession, tribes (Type C) (Type D) centries 
(Type A) Type B) 
A 1») A 2**) B 1*) B 2**) C 1*) C 2 **) D 1*) D 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1945-54 78 32 3 1 0 2 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 6 38 (+ 6) 
1955-64 128 49 5 3 1 1 0 15 3 2 2 2 0 6 1 1 1 0 0 9 1 0 2 0 1 8 64 (+15) 
1965-74 150 36 2 3 4 0 0 9 0 0 2 1 0 11 1 1 0 0 0 8 1 1 0 0 0 1 45 (+ 9) 
1975-85 172 43 2 10 3 0 0 13 1 2 1 0 0 10 0 6 2 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 60 (+17) 
Total - 160 12 17 8 3 2 46 4 4 5 3 0 32 3 8 4 0 0 31 5 2 2 0 1 15 207 (+47) 
*) With foreign participation **) Without foreign participation 
(1) Industrialized countries (5) In Europe 
(2) Third World countries (6) In the Third World 
(3) Industrialized and Third World countries jointly 
(4) In Europe 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the list compiled by U . Borschardt et al. (Note 2). 
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1. since the Second World War the globe has only been without a war for a 
few days, to wit, for 26 days in September 1945; 
2. besides the highly publicized wars in Lebanon, in Afghanistan, and in the 
Persian Gulf at the end of the "Year of Peace" twenty-six other "for-
gotten" wars continued, such as that in Eritrea (since 1961), in Chad (since 
1966), in the Philippines (since 1970), in Northern Ireland (since 1969), 
and in Cambodia (since 1978); 
3. depending upon the calculations, these wars have taken the lives of 
between 25 and 35 million human beings. This justifies the thesis that, in 
comparison to the losses in World Wars I and II of 12 and 56 million 
respectively, the much-feared third world war is already taking place in 
the form of Third World wars; 
4. of the current 172 states in the global Community 54 % have been involved 
in at least one war, with a total of 335 participations in war, while in 80 of 
these conflicts third countries were involved; 
5. South Asia and Southeast Asia, Black Africa, and the Middle East are the 
regions most affected; 
6. ninety of the wars ended by 1984 were settled through military victory, 
while only 39 ended via negotiations; 
7. the aggressors were able to win in roughly a quarter of all wars and in only 
roughly one-third was a military stalemate reached; 
8. the number of wars carried out annually is growing continuously: 1945: 3; 
1955: 15; 1965: 24; 1975: 21; 1985; 33. 
9. the number of those wars which are difficult to identify has grown 
disproportionately, as reflected in Table 2. This is undoubtedly evidence 
of the fact that, besides methodological problems in assigning the con-
flicts, there has been a growing fusion of conflict reasons; 
10. finally, the location of almost all wars (151 out of 160) is in the Third 
Wor ld , of which three-quarters (140 cases) of the cases studied have been 
pure Third World wars, be they civil wars or wars in the form of 
intervention by other states (31 cases). 
The tendency of Third World countries to conduct their conflicts among 
themselves even without the co-operation or participation of industrialized 
states wi l l certainly have to lead to a rethinking in the search for the causes of 
war frequency. Elevating the theses that "the Third World . . . is at war with 
itself" while the "industrialized societies are a bastion of peace" to the level of 
absolute truth, however, is nevertheless wrong. 2 2 The industrialized countries 
were or are openly and directly involved in 57 cases, including wars of 
decolonization, either by themselves or with the aid of other Third Wor ld 
countries. 
Regional Conflicts in the Third World 33 
III. The Causes o f W a r s i n t h e T h i r d W o r l d : A n A t t e m p t e d S u r v e y 2 * 
A s already intimated, no systematic findings concerning the "objective" 
causes and the "subjective" reasons exist to date as to why states or groups of 
states solve their disagreements in violent ways. In view of this fact, it goes 
without saying that current research is still far from being able to offer a 
convincing theory about the causes of all wars and types of wars, or to 
discover underlying laws. Due to the multiplicity of reasons for wars the 
additional question poses itself as to whether this wi l l ever be possible, beyond 
such generalizations arguing that human behaviour is "determined by aggres-
sion" or by the "foolishness of those in power", as Barbara Tuchmann entitled 
her book. 2 4 
W i t h all due caution regarding the preliminary nature of past diagnoses and 
explanatory approaches, we wi l l now examine some of them more closely, 
despite the fact that initially they raise more questions than they answer. It is 
precisely because the possibility of resolving or arbitrating conflicts not only 
depends primarily on the means applied, but also on the causes of each conflict 
and the behaviour patterns exhibited by the conflicting parties,2 5 that no 
further justification for such an undertaking, albeit incomplete, is needed. 
1. W a r s as " S o u t h e r n D i m e n s i o n s o f t h e E a s t - W e s t C o n f l i c t " 
This approach is based on an interpretation of wars as "puppet wars" of the 
superpowers, who wish to avoid being involved in any direct confrontation 
because of Strategie considerations. This view has gained a certain amount of 
plausibility due to efforts undertaken by the superpowers since the seventies to 
transfer some of the interventionist tasks which they are unable to carry out 
themselves for political and Strategie reasons.26. The decisive weakness of this 
exaggerated emphasis on "Strategie thinking", however, undoubtedly lies in 
making the international factor an absolute one in which everything happening 
in the world is determined by superpower rivalry. 2 7 Because of this exclusive 
orientation to the East-West conflict all findings concerning the causes of 
conflict derived to date are of little explanatory value. This is particularly the 
case since local and regional sources of conflicts are generally excluded, just as 
is the internal dynamic of the conflict itself. 
It is undoubtedly true that in a deteriorating international Situation or in the 
case of a worsening global political conflict between the two superpowers an 
"internationalization of such conflicts beyond their own level of importance" 2 8 
is possible. It may even be the case that a superpower cannot afford to be 
without an interest anywhere in the w o r l d , 2 9 as Otto von Bismarck once 
formulated it. It nevertheless appears to be missing the point to look at the 
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Third World merely as the object of superpower interests, or to concede to it 
at most a secondary function within the East-West conflict by offering a 
monocausal explanation based on security considerations. This is emphasized 
by the fact that most wars and conflicts have not been started directly by the 
superpowers. 
It is true that a number of neocolonial ruling elites actively engage themsel-
ves in the East-West conflict because they are dependent upon the aid of the 
superpowers for securing their rule against internal and external opponents. 3 0 
For at least an equally large number of Third World states the East-West 
conflict constitutes a source of annoyance, however, since they would be able 
to dominate their region without the meddling of the superpowers.3 1 
Suspicions about this approach are confirmed by a C I A study which states 
that "despite the intentions of some governments in underdeveloped countries 
to establish a 'socialist' System . . . they generally wish to realize their own 
ideas about socialism and . . . were attracted to Soviet communist ideology 
neither by economic nor by military a id . " 3 2 To put it bluntly, as far as this 
exaggerated emphasis on the East-West conflict is understandable from the 
European perspective, the blind perception of the three pathologies "fear of 
encirclement," "fear of a vacuum", and "striving for Status"33 explains the lack 
of understanding about the fact that this conflict at best gives Third Wor ld 
elites a certain latitude to play off the superpowers against each other for their 
own purposes. This has been amply confirmed by the large number of games 
of "musical chairs" played in the states of the Third World . 
2. The more States, t h e more W a r s 
Also of little use for further research is the assumption that a direct 
connection exists between the growing number of states as a result of decoloni-
zation and the frequency of wars. 3 4 It is certainly plausible to note that 
between 1945 and 1965 the international Community grew from 66 to 125, 
while the number of borders grew from 404 to 778 and international neigh-
bourhoods expanded from 166 to 412. Nevertheless, no immediate connection 
exists between the growing number of states on the one hand and the number 
of internationalized wars on the other. In fact, a certain positive correlation 
exists between the tripling of the number of states in the world Community 
during this period and the number of wars started or still ongoing between 
states.35 
This approach at best points to a potential increase in violently conducted 
conflicts. It does not, however, provide convincing proof of the "functional-
ity" of war in Clausewitz's sense, since being neighbours alone does not cause 
wars. 
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3. W a r s as a Consequence o f t h e H e g e m o n i c a l Crises o f t h e Superpowers 
The increase in the number of states since 1945 from 66 to 172 today has 
nevertheless brought visible changes to the development of global society after 
the Second W o r l d War, which had effects not only within the framework of 
the United Nations. 3 6 It also contributed to the growing deterioration in the 
power of the superpowers. One cannot say for certain at this point whether 
this process is analogous to the decline of world empires 3 7 in that it represents 
the consequence of qualifying contests for the leading global role as hinted at 
by Senghaas38. Possibly it is only a temporary phenomenon in the sense of 
Kondratieff's theory of long waves, as argued by Bühl. 3 9 Because it is based on 
a concept of a development brought about by a diffusion of power within the 
international System, this approach is able to offer a more convincing explana-
tion of the growing frequency of wars, although it also is not their cause but 
simply one of several contributing factors. 
Evidence in this direction is supplied when looking at the international 
"crisis management" of the superpowers, especially the United States, in the 
last decade. While the U S was able until the late seventies sucessfully to force 
many conflicting parties to concede (1964 in the case of Turkey, when it 
threatened to invade Cyprus, 1965 in the Indo-Pakistan war, or in the fourth 
Middle East war in 1973), its capacity to exert influence has been reduced 
considerably. Likewise, the Soviet Union in 1976 was unable to prevent Syria 
from intervening in Lebanon. The US has not been able to induce the Israeli 
government to respect clearly articulated American wishes with regard to the 
Lebanon conflict, the Palestinian problem, the Status of Jerusalem, or its 
settlement policy. Neither superpower has had any influence in the Iran-Iraq 
war, which appears to mark a turning point toward a larger degree of 
independence in Third Wor ld conflicts. 4 0 
These indicators, although only roughly outlined here, can be traced back to 
a few factors which themselves in turn allow inferences about the willingness 
and ability of Third World states to Start and conduct their own wars: 
1. Both superpowers are prevented from fully utilizing their might due to a 
number of circumstances, since both must avoid the risk of direct confron-
tation that might result from their arms and military policies. 4 1 O f import-
ance here also is the inappropriateness of their "nuclear monomania" 4 2 
within the framework of local conditions. Military instruments are useless 
against social movements and currents such as Islamic "revitalization 
efforts". Nuclear weapons help even less. Neither the intervention of the 
Soviet U n i o n in Afghanistan nor that of the United States in Central 
America and in Lebanon has contributed toward helping their clients 
achieve a complete military or political victory. 
36 Mir A . Ferdowsi 
2. They have thus far been unable to agree on a Solution to acute conflicts and 
to push this through vis-a-vis their clients. The opposite is actually the case: 
the more they move in the direction of negotiating among themselves 
important aspects of a compromise peace, the stronger the resistance wi l l be 
from the respective parties to the conflict. Thus opportunities for a Solution 
wi l l decrease. Should they become advocates of their clients' demands, it is 
to be feared that even less willingness to compromise would emerge.43 
3. The capacities and organizational possibilities of the superpowers are 
limited due to their overcommitment. 4 4 Neither superpower has enough 
resources to honour all the global commitments into which it has entered.4 5 
It is becoming increasingly clear that any power which considers all parts of 
the globe to be equally vital is confronted with the problem of squandering 
power. It is self-evident that by only being able to exercise their roles in a 
limited fashion, their ability to honour obligations becomes less and thus 
also the credibility of the guarantee vitiated. 4 6 It is precisely because the 
possiblities and credibility of the superpowers as guarantor powers is today 
more limited than ever before that it is becoming ever more difficult for 
them to control their clients, including preventing them from starting wars. 
A t best they have a "reactive" ability to intervene in situations in which the 
balance has been temporarily upset and they are called in for the restoration 
of the Status quo. 
4. The influence of the superpowers on the quantitative and qualitative 
expansion of arms exports of Third World states47 and the diversification of 
sources for arms imports is dwindling. 4 8 Added to that is the creation of 
arms production inside many Third World countries. 4 9 This development is 
of decisive importance for a decline in superpower influence to the extent 
that historically major powers could only influence their clients to reduce 
crisis-inducing activities when the former also held a monopoly over 
weapons shipments. These conditions prevail in only relatively few regions 
of the world today. 
It remains to be seen whether these developments w i l l lead to a complete 
loss of the weapons monopoly held by Western and Eastern industrial 
societies, with this serving as the base for the Third World (analogous to the 
arming in the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1965 which broke the nuclear 
monopoly of the US) to "create a counterforce", such as is suspected by 
Senghaas.50 A t the moment, in any case, the arms production in Third World 
states is still limited and amounts to only 2 - 2.5 percent of global production 
of major weapons. Stanley Hoffman's call nevertheless holds true that we 
should correct the anachronistic picture which maintains that "the audacity of 
the pygmies is the result of the deterioration of American power". This should 
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be done by checking whether "the deterioration is not the result of the growth 
of the pygmies." 5 1 
Even if the approaches discussed so far do not offer convincing explanations 
for most of the wars in the Third World , much nevertheless argues in favour of 
a decoupling of rivalry between the two superpowers from regional conflicts. 
Senghaas rightly emphasizes that this "discommitment" actually favours the 
Third World "since the danger of excessive burdens from the political conflicts 
between East and West can be counteracted."5 2 The following approaches wi l l 
make it clear that there nevertheless still exist plenty of reasons for conflicts 
and "situations pregnant with wars" 5 3 in these regions which can lead to 
"homemade" wars. 
4. W a r s as a Consequence o f U n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t 
The view that internal social conflicts can be traced directly to socio-
economic inequality, misery, poverty, and hunger - in short to "structural 
violence" 5 4 - has prevailed for some time now in research on developing 
countries as well as in official government development policies. Thus, for 
example, the view that development policy is part of a global peace policy, as 
was expressed in the Sixth Report of the West German federal government in 
March 1985, is not a recent phenomenon. Instead, development was always 
seen as an instrument "for the long-term securing of peace through the 
promotion of economic and social progress in developing countries." 5 5 The 
motivations behind these declarations are clearly transparent since the fear 
exists that the causal chain of "poverty - social conflict- destabilization - a 
threat to peace" also poses a threat to peace in the West 5 6 . This approach 
nevertheless suffers particularly from its inability to explain whether and how 
individually experienced dissatisfaction and injustice is collectivized and 
politicized. If in fact the degree of "economic and social discrimination . . . 
determined the political stability or revolutionary tendencies of a population" 
then the world would stand in flames.5 7 
Despite this objection this very generalized perception regarding the con-
nection between economic crises and military conflicts gains in plausibility in 
three respects: 
Firstly, due to a "pentagonal" crisis that has emerged in the Third W o r l d : 
1. the penetration crisis, which deals with the extent of effective control 
exercised by the central government; 
2. the participation crisis, which is based on the question as to who is involved 
in the decision-making process of the government, or who does or does not 
have influence; 
38 Mir A . Ferdowsi 
3. the legitimacy crisis, i.e. to what extent are decisions made by the govern-
ment accepted or even acknowledged by the Citizens of a country; 
4. the distribution crisis, which concerns the question as to the extent to 
which government measures are used to distribute or redistribute material 
and other goods; 
5. and finally the national identity crisis, which refers to the "definition" of 
that number of people who are assumed to fall within the area of the 
decision-making process of the government.5 8 
Secondly, the tendency of elites in the Third World to externalize internal 
conflicts and instabilities. In doing so their goal is to generate integrative 
effects inside the country and possibly also to overcome internal pent-up 
aggression toward their rule which may result in organized Opposition. Here 
the preference is for conflicts with neighbours who have long been seen as 
having opposing interests and whose government acts on the premise that its 
policies rest on the broad agreement of the people. 
Thirdly, based on observations it appears that the greater the degree of 
political instability with regard to socio-economic and social conflicts, the 
more vulnerable are states to interventions from abroad, and the more frequent 
and intensive are the verbal and non-verbal attacks from neighbouring coun-
tries on the internally weakened regime. This leads to the danger of violent 
clashes.59 
5. W a r s as a R e s u l t o f t h e C o l o n i a l Past 
The so-called colonialism hypothesis is relatively useful, especially because 
of the tendency described above of shifting responsibility for conflicts to the 
outside. 
This approach is based on the premise that conflicts taking place in the Third 
World at the present time have historical roots which reach far into the 
precolonial past. Indeed, is revealed in Table 2, in a surprisingly large number 
of wars of type B and C the "factor of conquest at some point in the past" 
appears to have played a part. 6 0 The "after-effect of the historical principle of 
conquest" is seen here to be the fundamental precondition for the emergence 
of many conflicts, although they certainly take on an multiplicity of varia-
tions. 6 1 
The colonial past becomes a triggering factor not only when one examines 
retrospectively the precise way in which colonialism proceeded. The same 
holds true with regard to conflict rationalizations advanced by the parties 
involved. Surprisingly enough, this is also the case in those conflicts in which 
the parties are of a "progressive-socialist" persuasion. Finally, its importance 
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becomes clear in the finding that states with many borders drawn by the 
colonial powers are involved in wars particularly often, while the connection 
between non-colonial borders and participation in war does not appear to be 
significant.6 2 These mechanisms can be traced to at least three factors: 
F i r s t l y , they are due to the circumstance under which the colonial powers 
created artificial borders (for example, at the Berlin Congo Conference in 
1884). These were to prove to be problematic later from an ethnic, political, 
and economic perspective. The division into respective colonial zones of 
influence without regard for the linguistic and religious membership of the 
inhabitants proved to have particularly catastrophic consequences for the 
subsequent states as well als local ethnic groups. Upper Volta (now Burkina 
Faso), for example, was founded in 1919 by separating the territory from the 
French Sudan and shortly thereafter annexing it to the Ivory Coast until 1947. 
Then it was given the Status of autonomous French possession until independ-
ence in 1960. It is against the background to this colonial practice and its 
transfer to the "neocolonial" states that it becomes apparent, why, for 
example, in West Africa the Mande peoples are divided between Gambia, 
Senegal, Guinea, M a l i , Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast. The Ewe live in 
Ghana, Togo, and Benin, and the Wolofs in Gambia, Senegal, and Mauritania. 
The fact that in the Sahara region alone ten countries covering 14,000 kilomet-
res were created with a ruler 6 3 caused the historian Ki-Zerbo of Burkina Faso 
to comment, with justification: "One gets outraged at the wall of shame in 
Berlin but one forgets all of the Berlin walls which dismember A f r i c a . " 6 4 
Secondly, they come from the tendency of the colonial powers to exploit 
already existing conflicts as they established their colonial rule and gave 
themselves the appearance of arbitrators. As a rule this permitted them to settle 
conflicts temporarily through the order of "pax colonialica" 6 5 , which also 
served their own imperial interests. A n example of this was the British/Russian 
effort to settle the fight between the Ottomans and the Persians regarding the 
establishment of the border in Shatt al Arab in 1823.66 
O f even graver importance is, t h i r d l y , that the colonial powers, due to their 
ignorance concerning the historical backgrounds to these conflicts, did not 
have appropriate criteria regarding the future. Thus they were unable to decide 
in whose favour they ought to settle the numerous conflicts, assuming they 
were even willing to arbitrate in this fashion. They therefore limited themsel-
ves to the practice of supporting those local forces who were willing to 
maintain internal peace in co-operation with the colonial powers or who 
subordinated themselves to the new powers with limited resistance. This 
practice, of course, had devastating consequences for later development. 
In view of this mechanism of "conflict conservation" during the colonial era 
it is thus of little wonder that many of these conflicts immediately broke out 
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again in the postcolonial phase. This was especially the case where the political 
and social consequences of these conflicts had not been sufficiently mastered 
so that they could have become legitimated by the conditions of ruling 
established through them. 
6. W a r s as t h e R e s u l t o f I n t e r n a l C o l o n i a l i s m 
This view of the origins of conflict appears to be especially applicable for 
Type B wars. It refers to the Observation that may religiously, linguistically, or 
racially defined groups lead wars of secession because they feel underprivileged 
vis-a-vis a ruling elite of a different ethnic origin and consider this Situation as 
foreign rule or internal colonialism. 6 7 This interpretation of such wars surely 
requires a more detailed differentiation. The real problems begin with the 
definition of the concept itself. As Kimminich 6 8 has correctly pointed out, 
labels such as "national minorities", "ethnic minorities", "nationality", and 
"ethnic groups", are as difficult to define as terms such as "people", and 
"nation". This holds true even though they share the same characteristics 
according to international law: a common language, culture, historical fate. In 
short, they are in principle the same as a nation but without a State. In addition 
conclusive evidence concerning the Utility of this interpretation can only be 
provided by differentiating according to social characteristics. Among these 
are, for example, the size and number of the minorities inside a respective 
society, the degree of discrimination, the type of social interaction between the 
minorities and the dominant groups, and, finally, the various objectives for 
which the minorities are fighting and for which the dominant groups are 
persecuting them. In this regard at least three variations for the Start of a 
conflict are possible: 
f i r s t l y , when an oppressed and exploited minority claims for itself the 
democratic right to political participation and thus enters into conflict with the 
ruling majority; 
secondly, when a population group which makes up the majority in a 
geographic region is refused political rights (for example, autonomy) or these 
are withdrawn after a short period of time; and 
t h i r d l y , when a majority which was oppressed by precolonial traditional 
ruling structures acts against the ruling autochtonous minority after the 
attainment of national independence.69 
It is particularly with regard to the third variant that it becomes crucial to 
examine the goals of the group more closely. This avoids lumping together 
such differing types of minorities as "pluralist", "integrating", "secessionist", 
and "militant", with their often very different and even contrary objectives. 
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7. W a r s as a Process o f C a t c h i n g U p 
Differentiating between the various objectives of minorities would also 
provide further information concerning the Utility of the "catching up" 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis territorial disputes in the final 
analysis present a "process of catching up" as part of consolidating the artificial 
nation State as it was left behind by the colonial powers. 7 0 It is undoubtedly 
true that many of the wars within and between Third Wor ld countries can also 
be traced to the fact that colonialism - as outlined briefly above - left behind in 
many regions of the world not only underdeveloped and deformed economic 
structures, but also often a barely sustainable microstate System splintered into 
many national units. A s Krippendorff has correctly argued, 7 1 what needs to be 
reconstructed historically is the degree to which other non-territorial State 
alternatives of political organizations existed in postcolonial societies. It 
should be noted, however, that the concept of "nation" or "nation State" 
which was introduced in the postcolonial era by the colonial powers or small 
elites as a constitutional prerequisite for independence often runs counter to its 
impact on territorial, ethnic, religious, and geographic traditions. 
As a rule national structures were not a part of the political and cultural 
heritage of the "old empires with tributary modes of production." Apart from 
Korea, China (with minorities in South and East), Persia and Turkey (each 
with national minorities), and Somalia, no State in the South of the O l d Wor ld 
consisted of only one people. 7 2 
This circumstance, as well as the political and administrative division of 
these societies into "national states", seems to confirm the suspicion that in 
many Third Wor ld countries the same process of national consolidation is 
being carried out through wars of secession and border wars as those which 
took place in Europe during the last two to three hundred years. 7 3 Even in 
Europe the nation State became the mode of expression for national demands 
as a result of the territorial consolidation of the nation State. This contributed 
to the internal consolidation of states (while maintaining ethnic and religious 
diversity), although the fundamental question poses itself as to whether a 
"catching up" with European development is either justified or even possible. 
The experiences gained with the failed attempts to transfer Western or Eastern 
concepts of modernization contradict in any case the view that "the nation, by 
legitimizing political rule internally and externally, and the nation State 
providing the institutional framework, appears at present to be the only 
historically viable alternative as the organizational form for development 
policy in order to solve the problems of the colonial and semicolonial countries 
in the direction of emancipating them." 7 4 
In this regard the question poses itself as to whether the currently growing 
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discomfort of many development specialists brought about by the failure of 
past efforts cannot be traced to mistakes made by the "development experts" 
themselves. T o date they have laid a one-sided emphasis on economics and the 
State as the constitutional precondition for development and have thought only 
about "structural heterogeneity", the role of "the State" and "state elites in 
peripheral capitalism". They have filled entire libraries with publications 
regarding the possibility, or lack thereof, of "transferring Western develop-
ment models" to the states of the Thir ld World . The deeper problem of many 
states, however - the "digestion" of the transfer of the European State concept 
in the form of the "nation State" principle - has been insufficiently addressed. 
The treatment of such fundamental historical "misdevelopments" or "debts" 
gains in importance to the extent that one might find out that past failed 
development efforts may, in the final analysis, be the logical or unavoidable 
consequence of the deceptive hopes of the postcolonial era. These hopes were 
based on the idea that the creation of nations ("nation building") would enable 
the homogenization of heterogeneous societies analogous to the European and 
American experiences, in order to create better conditions for democracy and 
development in these regions as well. 
Overall this brief outline of conditions confirms the supposition that, in 
addition to current global political factors, locating the cause of armed 
conflicts and determining which situations are "pregnant with war" in the 
Third World w i l l only be possible with a more thorough reevaluation of the 
region's historical developments. N o t only development specialists but also 
peace researchers appear to have put the fact out of their minds that "the 
United Nations are as little united as most of their members are nations." 7 5 
The narrow perspectives employed to date led to the internalization of the 
"state" as the unquestionable or rather unquestioned main form of collective 
existential security as well as the uncritical following of trends. Whatever may 
have been the reasons for that, research on the causes of war must urgently 
overcome not only the ideological persistence of "state" and "matters of 
state"7 6, but also Western and Eastern interpretations of war. 7 7 In short, a 
scholarly treatment of this topic that expects to be taken seriously cannot avoid 
crossing discipline frontiers any more than it can avoid attempting to look for 
and overcome invariances78 if it wants to pose the right questions or even to 
recognize them in the first place. 
IV. Perspectives 
To point to perspectives in the final analysis is nothing more than to project 
past and present situations and trends into the future. The risk is, of course, 
that future developments w i l l prove one wrong. This applies without a doubt 
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especially to predictions concerning the Third World . However, a pessimistic 
- realistic - look at past developments points in the direction that, in the short 
and medium term, a reduction in violently-conducted conflicts in the Third 
W o r l d should not be anticipated. The opposite development is more likely, 
since 
1. differing resource endowments and in some cases resource scarcity of 
individual countries, as well as a greater degree of differentiation between 
individual Third Wor ld countries, promote rather than dampen potential 
conflicts over social structures and territorial borders; 
2. in view of the socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions of many 
conflicts, it is to be expected that the causes of armed conflict w i l l multiply. 
This is based on the fact that the economic Situation in most countries of the 
South w i l l intensify internal unrest and social conflicts and w i l l create 
tendencies to overthrow and to attempt to externalize conflicts by provok-
ing tensions and conflicts between states; 
3. due to the complexity of the causes and as a consequence of the limited 
possibilities of influencing these political and social processes from the 
outside, one should not anticipate a decrease in wars in the near future -
quite the contrary! 
4. finally, in view of the polyethnic Organization of states79, the development 
to date appears to be only the tip of the iceberg. 
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